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The Issue 
The role of state trading enterprises (STEs) is significant for international trade, especially 
since  the  Uruguay  Round.  They  account  for  large  shares  of  world  trade  in  certain 
products: about 40 percent for wheat and 30 percent for dairy products (WTO, 2000). This 
article examines the influence of STEs on the development of the agricultural sector in 
developing  countries.  During  both the  Uruguay  Round  and  Doha  Round  negotiations, 
there have been serious complaints from developing countries that the operation of STEs 
is trade distorting and creates serious obstacles to agricultural development.  
Implications and Conclusions 
Through application of the five forces competitive model (FFCM) of Michael Porter, the 
competitive environment is examined, and special attention is given to STEs that have a 
considerable distorting effect. During the Doha Round of WTO negotiations the role of 
STEs is again under consideration, the target being to decrease or eliminate their trade-
distorting operational practices. At this point there are proposals, on a modalities level, 
that can promote the above target and help developing countries to establish modern and 
profitable agricultural sectors. 
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State Trading Enterprises 
The GATT Agreement of 1994, Article XVII, defines STEs as follows: 
Governmental  and  non-governmental  enterprises,  including  Marketing 
Boards, which have been granted exclusive or special rights or privileges, 
including statutory or constitutional powers, in the exercise of which they 
influence through their purchases or sales the level or direction of imports 
or exports. (WTO, 1994) 
STEs vary in terms of structure, operation, power and function. Attempts to classify 
STEs  until  now  have  used  criteria  that  measure  market  contestability,  market 
concentration, trade shares, price differences and rents. According to this approach to 
classification,  there  are  three  types  of  STEs.  Type  I  STEs  are  characterized  by  low 
potential to distort trade. Type II STEs have the ability to distort trade flows, but in a way 
that  contestability  can  be  retrieved  without  serious  changes  in  the  way  they  operate. 
Type III STEs have adverse impacts on contestability and distort trade (WTO, 1996). The 
latter category includes all import STEs (those that operate as monopolies for import of 
goods into a country); this type gives rise to the most strongly worded protests against 
STEs. The usual objectives of STEs are domestic price stabilization, market regulation 
and control and promotion of exports. The issues surrounding STEs are not new for the 
WTO.  In  order  to  monitor  the  operation  of  STEs,  the  GATT  itself  established  the 
International Trade Organization (ITO) in 1948. An entire chapter was created under the 
title  “Restricted  Trade  Policies”.  During  that  period,  the  trading  environment  was  not 
mature enough to put obstacles in the way of developed-country STEs. STEs functioned 
as one of the most effective means by which developed countries enlarged their market 
shares on an international level. This was especially true for the United States, where the 
pressure  not  to  make  changes  to  the  operation  of  STEs  was  so  strong  that  President 
Truman withdrew the “Restricted Trade Policies” chapter (Veeman, Fulton and Larue, 
1999). In 1957 the issue of STEs arose again under Article XVII of the GATT: reporting 
requirements represented an attempt to monitor and evaluate the degree of distortion of 
international trade that could be attributed to STEs. 
STEs and the Competitive Environment 
One of the most useful tools for evaluating the competitive environment in a market is 
Michael  Porter’s  “five  forces  competitive  model,”  or  FFCM  (Day,  1984).  The  five 
parameters the model examines are 
•  the threat of new entrants; 
•  the bargaining power of suppliers; 
•  the bargaining power of consumers; 
•  the threat of substitute products; and 
•  the intensity of rivalry amongst competing firms. Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  G. N. Vlontzos 
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Threat of New Entrants 
STEs that focus on exports face threat from new entrants because on a global level there 
are no monopolies. This threat can be minimized by using various contracting methods 
that do not allow new firms to claim market share. Such methods include direct contracts 
between exporting and importing STEs, and tariff rate quotas (TRQs) administered by the 
“historical importers” and “state traders” methods. Under these methods no new entries 
are  possible,  the  level  of  competition  is  very  low  and  the  market  is  monopolistic  or 
oligopolistic.  
In the case of STEs that focus on imports, no new entries into the market are possible. 
There is no competition in the internal market, which is monopolistic.  
Bargaining Power of Suppliers 
The  bargaining  power  of  suppliers  in  markets  where  STEs  focus  on  exports  is  quite 
important, because usually the quantities being traded are very large and can give traders 
the opportunity to claim better prices and enlarge their market share.  
In  the  case  of  STEs  that  focus  on  imports,  the  bargaining  power  of  suppliers  is 
absolute; they have the ability to set any price they wish by using political targets as 
criteria, ignoring the existing market balances on an international level.  
Bargaining Power of Consumers 
The bargaining power of consumers in the case of exporting STEs is not very strong, 
because the quantities being traded are very large and the number of such enterprises is 
quite low. This leads to the conclusion that there are not many alternative choices for 
consumers, and the market is oligopolistic.  
The  trading  environment  that  is  created  where  STEs  focus  on  imports  leaves  no 
choice to consumers, and thus no bargaining power to consumers. In most cases, such a 
situation  has  positive  effects  for  the  consumers  of  developing  countries  and  negative 
effects  for  the  consumers  of  developed  countries.  This  occurs  because  the  aim  in 
developing countries is to satisfy demand with low-priced agricultural products, while in 
developed  countries  the  aim  is  to  protect  internal  production  from  international 
competition.  
The operation of an importing STE is the most effective way to stabilize prices at a 
level high enough to cover production costs and create a satisfactory profit for producers.  
Threat of Substitute Products 
The threat of substitute products is not strong, because agricultural products being traded 
by  STEs  are  usually  cereals  or  dairy  products,  which  are  irreplaceable  and  are 
characterized  by  inelastic  demand.  This  lack  of  substitute  products  becomes  the  most 
important reason to establish market conditions that will create competition and decrease 
trade distortions.  Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  G. N. Vlontzos 
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Intensity of Rivalry amongst Competing Firms 
Intensity of rivalry amongst competing firms is not high in the case of exporting STEs and 
does not exist at all in the case of importing STEs. This lack is due to advance deals 
arrived at between countries on the political level; such deals do not allow market forces 
to operate. 
From the above analysis it is obvious that the most trade-distorting type of STE is the 
type that focuses on imports. Exporting STEs are not alone in the international context, 
and they operate in a competitive environment; however, when they have to negotiate 
with importing STEs they are victims of the distortion that characterizes the operation of 
importing STEs. Since the last GATT agreement, the operation of STEs has been under 
increased monitoring and evaluation. Article XVII of the GATT 1994, Paragraph 1 of the 
Understanding, obliges all members of the WTO to submit annual notifications of their 
state trading activities. Unfortunately, for the year 2003 only 12 members submitted their 
reports (WTO, 2003a). There is deep concern among members of the WTO about the 
reporting periods for notifications and updates. The common belief tends to be that the 
current timetable is too tight. The failure of so many members to submit reports creates a 
serious lack of information and gives rise to concerns about the ways in which STEs 
affect or even distort international trade. These concerns take on a further dimension due 
to the fact that the Doha Round has not yet been completed (WTO, 2003b). 
STEs in Relation to Food Aid and Export Credits 
During the previous GATT negotiations there were additional topics of interest that, under 
more  intense  study,  show  another  dimension  to  the  role  of  STEs.  Many  developing 
countries  protested  the  food  aid  and  export  credit  systems,  and  during  the  current 
negotiations they have argued for structural changes to these systems at the operational 
level. Food aid is a mechanism for providing, among other things, crucial agricultural 
products  to  least-developed  or  developing  countries.  For  developed  countries,  which 
provide the food products, this mechanism allows the opportunity to manage both their 
stocks and prices. The usual status for food aid operations is that when stocks are at high 
levels, the quantities granted as food aid are high as well, and the international prices of 
these products tend to decline. When stocks are at low levels, the quantities granted as 
food aid are low, and the international prices tend to increase. There are several estimates 
claiming that this way of managing stocks is a secret price stabilization mechanism that 
uses  the  lack  of  production  infrastructure  in  developing  countries  to  continue  to give 
production incentives to agricultural producers in developed countries. Usually the quality 
of the products concerned is low and the trading parties that the operational tasks fall to 
are STEs focused on exports (IATRC, 2001).  Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  G. N. Vlontzos 
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The other parameter mentioned above that affects trade is the export credit system. 
Export credits include  
…  direct  financing  support,  comprising  direct  credits/financing, 
refinancing and interest rate support; risk cover, comprising export credit 
insurance  or  reinsurance  and  export  credit  guarantees;  government-to-
government  credit  agreements  covering  the  imports  of  agricultural 
products exclusively from the creditor country under which some or all of 
the risk is undertaken by the government of the exporting country; and 
any other form of governmental export credit support, direct or indirect, 
including  deferred  invoicing  and  foreign  exchange  risk  hedging.  
(WTO, 2003c)  
It is obvious that a variety of bank products and services are included under the term, and 
each one has its own positive or negative impact on trade, prices and market share. One of 
the most distorting ways of applying export credits is to establish trade agreements that 
depute exclusively the exporting rights to the creditor. In many cases the creditor is an 
exporting STE from the developed world. All the other forms of financing aim to manage 
and  minimize  the  operational  risk  included  in  a  trade  act,  or  to  motivate  structural 
adjustment of the agricultural sector. When a STE has exclusive rights for exports through 
an export credit agreement, every market force is ignored. The importing country does not 
have the ability to negotiate the price or quality of the product; the STE can reduce its 
stock through a closed agreement and create revenue with what is usually a low-quality 
commodity; and the STE can also create more profit, as a side effect, through the interest 
rates. Export credits that are granted to meet short-term consumer needs in developing 
countries can satisfy the demand for the products in question, but when this practice is the 
common  route  chosen  to  solve  such  problems,  the  long-term  prospects  for  internal 
production are not auspicious (Canadian Committee on Agriculture, 2006).  
Developing countries facing food shortage problems – even, in some cases, famine 
problems  –  cannot  act  as  equal  members  of  the  WTO  when  they  are  being  used  by 
developed countries as part of a diffusion mechanism to balance their production and 
trading  systems.  The  argument  the  developed  countries  make,  especially  the  United 
States, is that export credits, STEs and export subsidies are mechanisms that keep prices 
of agricultural commodities low in order that developing countries will be able to acquire 
such products without worsening their debts and trade deficits. The U.S. Department of 
Agriculture  maintains  that  elimination  of  these  mechanisms  would,  because  the 
agricultural market is characterized by imperfect competition, increase market prices on 
an international level, thus reducing the ability of developing countries to acquire the 
agricultural products they need (USDA, 1998). This argument has two weak points with 
regard to the developed countries, one internal and one external. The first is that it ignores 
the fact that the primary sector is not competitive and appears feasible only through the Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  G. N. Vlontzos 
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subsidization system each country has established. In 1994 the WTO began attempting to 
liberalize agricultural trade and decouple subsidies from production. The continuation of 
this attempt, through the new Doha Round, will result in the minimization of the gap 
between internal and international prices, with the former to decrease and the latter to 
increase. The use of export subsidies and export credits in order to meet consumer needs 
has  totally  adverse  outcomes  with  regard  to  the  WTO  liberalization  strategy  and, 
hopefully, will be eliminated.  
The  second  weak  point  of  the  argument  is  a  continuation  of  the  first,  but  on  an 
international level. The new opportunities being created though freer market access and 
increased  prices  create  the  most  suitable  environment  for  structural  adjustment  and 
development and/or establishment of production wherever there is competitive advantage 
for the developing countries. This shift allows the population of such countries to gain two 
very important things, income and partial satisfaction of demand with their own products. 
The liberalization strategy stabilizes the world market, creates income and  wealth and 
creates opportunity for improvement in any production channel, be it in a developed or a 
developing country. 
It  is  a  common  belief  that  the  step-by-step  procedure  of  reducing  tariffs  and 
liberalizing  agricultural  trade  will  lead  to  an  increase  in  international  prices  and  the 
establishment of new producing and trading opportunities for developing countries. The 
products of developing countries can have two marketing channels, one to meet domestic 
needs and the other to gain market share on an international level. Both these channels can 
boost the economies of these countries and reduce their dependence on food aid programs 
and the inefficient operation of exporting and importing STEs. The interrelationship will 
force both developed and developing countries to improve STEs and to minimize their 
role and importance, thus allowing market forces to establish a less distorting marketing 
environment. 
Finally export credits must in the future be used from a more development-oriented 
perspective,  having  as  their  target  the  financing  of  investment  projects,  rather  than 
operating as a mechanism to meet consumer needs over the short term. According to this 
way  of  thinking,  the  WTO  must  cease  to  accept  the  ability  of  the  creditor  to  have 
exclusive exporting rights, because such a situation is highly distorting and does not lead 
to economic growth for the recipients. On the contrary, this way of satisfying consumer 
needs intensifies misallocation of resources, enlarges external debt and trade deficit and 
postpones the establishment of market oriented production channels. 
Discussion and Conclusions 
The above analysis intends to examine the ways STEs operate in both developing and 
developed countries and the effects they have on economic growth, from a strictly market 
oriented point of view and according to the current WTO spirit. It is obvious that more 
steps need to be taken at both structural and operational levels, and these steps must be Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  G. N. Vlontzos 
 
 
      119 
analyzed one by one. Liberalization of agricultural trade is a process that does not accept 
statutory or constitutional rights, which totally ignore market forces. Experience to date 
proves that the status quo helps the economies of the developed world to grow while 
depriving developing countries of opportunities for domestic and international growth. 
Among the other measures being proposed to improve the economies of the developing 
countries,  significant  steps  need  to  be  taken  with  regard  to  STEs;  such  decisions  can 
create free space and permit developing economies to move and grow in a less distorting 
trade environment. 
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